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Abstract
This paper explores the potential for environmental information and
dissonance-inducing messaging to encourage resourceful behavior. We
manipulate message framing to analyze behavioral motivators businesses
may consider when encouraging customers—here, those with revealed
environmental preferences—from paper to online communications. In
a large-scale natural field experiment comprising 38,654 customers of
a renewable energy provider, we randomize environmental information
and messaging rooted in theories of cognitive dissonance in email com-
munications promoting an active switch to paperless billing. We find
that environmental information and imagery is ineffective in inducing be-
havior change. Interestingly, the dissonance-inducing messaging weakly
improves uptake among our main sample but backfires among a sub-
sample of individuals with extensive postgraduate education. Contrary
to the majority of the literature on gender and environmental behavior,
females in our sample are less likely to switch to paperless billing.
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Introduction
Businesses and governments are increasingly turning to randomized experiments
to discover means by which to increase profitability or pursue policy goals. In a
number of contexts, social and private objectives coincide, creating opportunity
for partnerships between academic researchers and businesses interested in
either or both of said objectives.1 Companies with clear sustainability or
corporate social responsibility objectives or whose resource use is both socially
and privately costly (e.g., see Gosnell et al., 2016) may be especially motivated
to identify cost-efficient means to improve their resourcefulness due to the
increased competitiveness and profitability associated with “innovation offsets”
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).
As a means of increasing the efficiency and resourcefulness of operations,
the business world has seen a clear and rapid capitalization upon technological
advancements, such as mobile phone applications and text messaging, or
automatic bill pay (ABP). However, enrollment in such programs may lead
to consumer welfare loss. For instance, Sexton (2015) demonstrates that
residential energy consumers enrolled in ABP increased energy consumption by
4.0% on average and 7.3% for small- to medium-sized commercial and municipal
customers. Thus, while enrolling customers in alternative bill payment schemes
may decrease transaction costs for retailers and improve resourcefulness, the
act may come at a cost in terms of customer satisfaction, convenience, financial
awareness, and ultimately retention. Instead, companies may offer the option to
switch voluntarily, but status quo bias2 and potential costs (e.g., from increased
consumption, as shown above) suggest that many consumers may refrain from
opting in.
How can companies maximize customers’ voluntary participation in schemes
that increase the resourcefulness of communications or information provision?
In this study, we investigate means by which to facilitate such cost- and
resource-efficient change without imposing the change upon the customer. We
1A prominent example of the merging of social and private objectives is the founding
of Opower, a thriving for-profit energy information provider founded upon robust research
originally intended to help energy suppliers transition their business models to increase
customer satisfaction and retention. Using a customer-centric approach involving provision of
tailored social norm information to households, Opower’s product helps utilities’ customers
to scale back on inefficient and privately costly energy consumption in the home, while
simultaneously reducing environmentally costly greenhouse gas emissions (Allcott, 2011).
2In an experimental study on green nudges to deter junk mail, Liebig and Rommel (2014)
demonstrate that mandated choice is more effective than active choice in overcoming status
quo bias with respect to placement of “No Junk Mail” stickers on mailboxes, though only
about a fifth of subjects take up the scheme.
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manipulate message framing to analyze behavioral motivators ‘green’ busi-
nesses may consider when encouraging customers—here, those with revealed
environmental preferences—to engage in resource-saving behaviors. We ex-
plore a role for targeted messaging based on consumer preferences and beliefs
through randomization of environmental information and messaging rooted
in theories of cognitive dissonance, a phenomenon centered upon a desire for
consistency in self-perception. The research design rests on the assumption
that the customer base of Good Energy, a 100% renewable energy supplier in
the United Kingdom and our partner in this study, is characterized by strong
environmental preferences.3 In light of the social mission of Good Energy and
its customers’ selection into their customer base, we conceptualize a utility
function susceptible to information and cognitive dissonance, designing in-
terventions to manipulate arguments in the utility function related to social
preferences and self-perception.
Neoclassical economics holds that information influences behavior through
its effects on individuals’ internal cost-benefit analyses, which are rooted in pref-
erences characterized by selfishness (DellaVigna, 2009). More recent economic
theories posit that such internal cost-benefit analyses incorporate altruistic
preferences, so that social objectives may play a role in decision-making (Becker,
1974; Andreoni, 1989, 1990). Theories in social psychology draw similar conclu-
sions regarding the role of information on attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Ajzen
and Fishbein, 1980; Stern, 2000; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). However,
perhaps counter to intuition, there is ample empirical evidence that calls into
question the effectiveness of information in changing human behavior. A first
goal of this experiment is to test whether social information—defined more
specifically here as information on the (environmental) externalities associ-
ated with one’s privately beneficial actions—influences the decision making of
3The assumption is founded upon the mission of Good Energy “to keep the world a
habitable place by offering consumers an active role in addressing climate change.” At the
time of the study, it was the sole utility that sourced 100% of its electricity from renewable
sources (wind, sun, and rain), and it supplies carbon-neutral biogas from organic materials.
Additionally, while Good Energy’s prices are comparable with the Big Six Standard tariffs
(i.e. those paid by approximately 60% of UK residents), Good Energy’s customer base is
comprised of consumers who are engaged in the energy market and therefore actively switch.
While Good Energy’s tariffs are in the 75th percentile of available tariffs in its market,
its customers pay a premium of approximately 25% compared to the cheapest available
tariff, suggesting that their motivation is not strictly monetary. Finally, while Good Energy
customers’ consumption is quite similar to the average consumption in the UK, they are
primarily ‘ABC1’ (i.e. consumers presumed to be from high social and economic categories
with more education and income than those under other classifications. Thus, consumption
may be relatively low when house size is taken into consideration.
3
individuals with revealed environmental preferences. That is, the first inter-
vention aims to promote paperless billing through provision of information on
environmental costs associated with paper use.
Demand for social information is apparent in the experiment of Cain and
Dana (2012). In their study, a significant proportion (63%) of subjects in
the control group chose to reveal the external consequences of their actions
when given the opportunity to behave selfishly while remaining ignorant to
the consequences; even more surprisingly, 24% actually paid to reveal such
externalities. Of those who revealed, 44% and 50% (respectively) chose the
more altruistic option, whereas all subjects who did not reveal made the selfish
choice.4 Remaining ignorant to the externality, therefore, allows for justification
of action upon one’s private utility alone, i.e. regard for external costs.
Once social information has been consumed and acted upon, it may be
possible to create a virtuous circle by appealing to one’s voluntarily established
identity with the cause (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). While several cognitive
dissonance theories have been proposed and (to some extent) tested, field
experimentalists have arguably understudied the psychological phenomenon,
whether as a means to explain behaviors inconsistent with neoclassical economic
predictions or as a vehicle for behavior change. The second intervention
therefore investigates the role that innate desire for consistency across one’s
beliefs and behaviors may play in encouraging repeated conservation.
Finally, a sparse literature appears to suggest that imagery can induce
behavior change. For instance, a series of lab experiments (Haley and Fessler,
2005; Burnham and Hare, 2007; Rigdon et al., 2009; Mifune et al., 2010) and field
experiments on honesty, littering, and donating (Bateson et al., 2006; Ernest-
Jones et al., 2011; Ekström, 2012) demonstrate that an image of eyes can cause
individuals to comply with cooperative norms in some contexts. Additionally,
money priming has been shown to lead people to make less altruistic decisions
or to focus their attention on monetary features of products (see Vohs, 2015,
for a review). Here, we test whether images of the environmental good under
threat (i.e., trees) can serve as a visual reminder of the externality associated
with subjects’ inaction and therefore increase their probability of acting.
In a large-scale natural field experiment comprising 38,654 Good Energy
customers, we randomize environmental information, dissonance-inducing mes-
saging, and environmental imagery in emails promoting an active switch to
4The effect of social information may be contextual, losing its bite in the presence of
moral licensing (Cain et al., 2005; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013) or strategic ignorance (Cain and
Dana, 2012; Golman et al., 2015).
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paperless billing (i.e. a one-off low-cost behavior).5 In addition to household-
level data on e-billing sign-up, our data allow for exploration of the roles of
both gender and education, two demographic factors that have been shown
to increase pro-environmental behavior (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). We
find that both imagery and information on environmental costs associated with
the status quo are ineffective in increasing uptake of paperless billing beyond
that of a control group. On the other hand, dissonance-inducing messaging
increases uptake among our main sample.
Interestingly, we find significant heterogeneity of uptake, both broadly
speaking and with respect to treatment. Interestingly, dissonance-inducing
messaging backfires among our highly educated sample, which we speculatively
attribute to a lesser need for reassurance of a moral (e.g., socially-minded)
self-concept. This finding aligns with self-affirmation theory and findings
(Steele et al., 1993) and perhaps also with some economic theories of cognitive
dissonance (e.g., Akerlof and Dickens, 1982). To our knowledge, this is the
first study to demonstrate such nuanced heterogeneity among a large and
presumably educated sample.6 Additionally, the data suggest that women are
less likely than men to sign up to paperless billing. The research suggests
that individuals may be targeted with various forms of messaging to increase
environmentally advantageous behaviors at no additional cost, and calls into
question the general conclusion in the literature that women are more inclined
than men to behave in line with social or environmental objectives (Croson
and Gneezy, 2009; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
background on the mechanisms investigated in our treatments, namely the role
of information in environmental decision making and the infusion of cognitive
dissonance into the study of economic decision making. Section 3 outlines the
experimental design and details the interventions implemented across Good
Energy’s customer base. Section 4 reveals the results of the field experiment,
and Section 5 concludes.
5Environmental framing may also play a role in inducing cognitive dissonance by making
the individual aware of the external costs of their current behavior. Therefore, we do not
measure a ‘pure’ effect of cognitive dissonance, but rather an ‘additional’ effect of making
such dissonance particularly salient.
6Prior studies have demonstrated that education leads to higher green energy uptake
(Jacobsen et al., 2013).
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1 Background and motivation
1.1 Information provision: Be who you ought
While the rational economic man of neoclassical theory is influenced by two
primary motivators—information and incentives—social psychology and behav-
ioral economics reserve a role for evaluative, normative, and identity-driven
beliefs and motivations (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;
Elster, 2000; Stern, 2000; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). According to the
norm-activation theory of Schwartz (1973) and the value-belief-norm (VBN)
theory of Stern et al. (1999), knowledge of negative consequences associated
with one’s actions—or particular undesirable conditions for which one is per-
ceived to be responsible—spurs altruistic behavior. Therefore, information
regarding particular externalities (or internalities) may change individuals’
beliefs and intentions, in turn altering their proclivity to engage in socially or
personally beneficial behaviors (Stern, 2000).
Empirically speaking, and despite the overwhelming tendency of social
campaigns to communicate information with the goal of changing behavior,
the impact of consequence-based information on subsequent behavior has
proven negligible in a number of settings. During well-child appointments
in a Norwegian experiment, parents were randomly assigned to receive short
informational briefings and brochures on smoking and its harmful passive
effects on their children, and self-reported smoking behavior did not change
(Eriksen et al., 1996). Similarly, several studies demonstrate a non-effect of
information—including calories per item and recommended daily caloric intake—
on subsequent order choice in fast food restaurants (Harnack et al., 2008; Downs
et al., 2009). Likewise, extreme media coverage of the consequences of Enron’s
accounting scandal on 401(k) holdings did not prompt employees in similar
companies to diversify their 401(k) investments (Choi et al., 2005).
The consequences discussed above are primarily ‘internalities’, or unin-
tended costs of one’s actions that accrue to oneself alone. A meta-analysis of
interventions intended to reduce household energy consumption demonstrates
that information regarding externalities may increase knowledge but does not
subsequently alter behavior (Abrahamse et al., 2005). On the other hand, Fer-
raro and Price (2013) find that information on the extent and consequences of
water use among its (environmentally unconscious) customer base increased the
implementation of water-saving strategies, especially among high-consumption
households. Additionally, using a field experiment in Brazilian favelas, Toledo
(2016) finds that environmental persuasion increases take-up of LED (energy-
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efficient) light bulbs by 6 percentage points (or 13%).7 In contrast to our
setting, the outcome of interest in these cases is costly, as they require that
individuals actively change their habits or spend money to reduce their energy
and water consumption.
In addition, the interventions are applied to individuals who do not neces-
sarily exhibit a preference for the healthy or financially advantageous outcomes
that constitute the focus of those studies. Yet, there is some evidence suggest-
ing that such preferences may be instrumental in determining outcomes. In a
Dutch mass media campaign surrounding the causes of and possible behavioral
solutions for climate change, individuals who reported a higher willingness
to engage in pro-environmental behaviors were those who had already been
behaving in such a manner prior to the campaign (Staats et al., 1996). That
is, information campaigns may be more effective in inducing behavior change
among individuals already motivated prior to intervention.
We explore a role for information regarding environmental externalities
on a targeted audience of individuals exhibiting green preferences, where the
information provided is directly and specifically related to the outcome behavior
of interest. As environmental issues become more prominent in media and
education, this environmentally conscious audience is growing and is arguably
the segment of the population most inclined to change their behavior as a
result of exposure to information on environmental damage for which they
are (partially) responsible (see, e.g., Costa and Kahn, 2013). Such individuals
tend to possess a locus of control and, as with the subjects under study here,
have likely already acted prosocially in accordance with their environmental
knowledge in signing up to this particular utility. Unlike many studies in the
literature on the effects of information, our setting controls for any external
influences (e.g., economic or social incentives) and targets an extremely low-
cost behavior—namely making a one-time switch from paper billing to online
billing—so that attitudinal factors (as opposed to transaction costs) likely play
a direct role in decision making (Stern, 2000).
1.2 Cognitive dissonance: Be who you are
Theories of cognitive dissonance originated in psychology and have since piqued
the interest of a number of economists. The theories generally rest upon the
assumption that human beings are averse to inconsistencies between past or
7While persuasion is found to increase uptake of energy-efficient lighting, it is important
to note that subjects were asked to participate voluntarily and therefore the findings may
suffer from selection bias.
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current beliefs and behaviors (Festinger, 1962).8 In general, individuals strive
for consistency, competence, and morality in their perceptions of themselves,
and behaving in a manner that negates these features results in psychological
discomfort (Aronson, 1992). Such ‘dissonance’ is morally costly, and economic
agents will incorporate these costs into their utility maximization problems
(e.g., Gilad et al., 1987; Konow, 2000). Hence, cognitive dissonance may be able
to explain behavior anomalistic to the predictions of traditional neoclassical
theory.
According to Gilad et al. (1987), cognitive dissonance can manifest in situ-
ations in which “a decision is undertaken freely and with the understanding
of possible adverse outcomes” (p. 64). In their theory of selective exposure,
behavior remains consistent with traditional utility maximization if exposure
to certain types of information can be controlled and dissonance kept at a
level below some threshold, an assertion consistent with literature on informa-
tion avoidance (Cain and Dana, 2012; Golman et al., 2015). Otherwise, the
individual must change her beliefs (which is costly), and she will subsequently
maximize in accordance with a revised objective function.9
A more recent interpretation of cognitive dissonance emphasizes the role of
context in determining the extent to which one may rationalize decisions in light
of her beliefs. Mazar et al. (2008) put forth a theory of cognitive dissonance
in which the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior is dependent on
individuals’ mindfulness of and attention to their own moral standards. In
several laboratory experiments, Mazar et al. find that individuals who have the
opportunity to cheat do so, though they are less likely to cheat when reminded
of their moral beliefs or after signing an honor code. The authors argue that the
internal salience of self-concept is, therefore, an important driver of congruence
8In a seminal experiment, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) demonstrated that individuals
who completed an hour-long mind-numbing task in the lab rated the task more positively if
they were subsequently paid more money to convince new recruits to do the task. That is,
those paid $20 to convince new subjects to complete the task rated the task more favorably
than those paid $1 to recruit new subjects.
9Rabin (1994) proposes a similar structure for the utility function, adding a more nuanced
explanation of the contexts in which cognitive dissonance will increase the tension between
material benefit and psychological cost. For instance, he conjectures that an individual who
receives less material benefit from an immoral activity will further convince himself of the
immorality of the activity. Interestingly, he shows that a stronger proclivity toward cognitive
dissonance may pressure an individual with high material benefit from said activity into
changing her beliefs, thereby augmenting immoral activity.
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between belief and behavior.10
In a more formal economic theory, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) propose
a two-period model in which a rational individual first chooses whether to
participate in a safe or hazardous industry; if she chooses the latter, she will
convince herself of the safety of the industry so as to justify her past decision.
In the second period, a cost-effective safety device becomes available and the
individual—who would have purchased the device had it been available prior
to her perception change—continues to work without it. According to the
authors, their model justifies government intervention requiring hazardous
industry workers to wear the equipment in order to return to Pareto optimal
conditions.11
Finally, Konow (2000) posits a utility function comprising material wealth
along with two costly parameters: cognitive dissonance and self-deception. The
former characterizes the deviation between one’s beliefs and one’s actions—in
this case, the deviation between a fair allocation and one’s actual allocation
in a dictator game—while the latter captures the discomfort associated with
altering one’s initial fairness perspective to increase consistency between the
aforementioned allocations. Experimental results from several variants of the
dictator game, where subjects perform both active and passive roles, provide
strong empirical support for both phenomena.
Do individuals express opinions or take part in costly activities in order to
remain consistent with self-perceptions outside of the laboratory? Can cognitive
dissonance explain individual sacrifice for the sake of maximizing social welfare
in the real world? Indeed, social scientists have cited cognitive dissonance
as an explanation for voting behavior (Mullainathan and Washington, 2009),
investor inertia (Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Rennekamp et al., 2014), sexual
risk taking (Mannberg, 2012), diminished labor supply in the face of job
search discrimination (Goldsmith et al., 2004), endogenous class formation
(Oxoby, 2003), and honesty in the face of cheating opportunities (Mazar et al.,
2008). Furthermore, the phenomenon has been exploited as a means to ends
10The second contextual feature cited in Mazar et al. (2008) refers to the extent to which
the given context facilitates flexibility of interpretation with respect to self-perception, or
the extent to which the act may plausibly be considered consistent with the self-concept
(which may, in turn, depend on the strength and relevance of social norms; see Wichardt,
2012). For instance, Nail et al. (2004) point out that the dissonance-inducing act must be
voluntary and otherwise unjustifiable (or difficult to justify), and must involve perception of
commitment.
11While the model focuses on labor selection, it is also applied to explain the effectiveness
of non-informational advertising, the incidence of crime under various degrees of sanctions,
and the necessity of Social Security for individuals who are averse to acknowledging the
inevitability of old age.
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such as water use reduction (Dickerson et al., 1992), sustained weight loss
(Axsom and Cooper, 1985), condom use Stone et al. (1994),12 and reducing
hypothetical bias in contingent valuation studies (Alfnes et al., 2010). Perhaps
most relevant to the present study, Kantola et al. (1984) implemented a framed
field experiment (N=203, out of 429 initially contacted)13 where individuals who
were reminded that they had previously expressed agreement with a statement
claiming that individuals have a duty to save electricity reduced their electricity
consumption compared to a control group in a follow-up measurement period
of four weeks.14 In a more recent series of field experiments on voting behavior,
invoking the self-concept through use of noun identifier ("to be a voter") as
opposed to a verb ("to vote") in pre-election surveys significantly increased voter
turnout, demonstrating that provision of “positive self-regard” may substitute
for recognition from others for largely invisible behaviors (Bryan et al., 2011).
We extend the above strands of literature using a large-scale natural field
experiment to identify the influence of information provision and cognitive
dissonance in encouraging "green" renewable gas and energy consumers to
switch from resource-intensive paper billing to online billing. To investigate a
role for social information provision in promoting resourceful behavior, we pro-
vide the utility customers with information on the environmental consequences
of continuing to receive communications in the post. To test the impact of
cognitive dissonance on e-billing take-up, we promote present decision mak-
ing consistent with implicit beliefs associated with related past decisions by
increasing the salience of one’s revealed standard for environmental integrity,
as in (Mazar et al., 2008). In sum, we implement treatments that both ap-
peal to embedded environmental preferences and that target preferences for a
consistent self-perception.
In light of the above theories, we hypothesize that ‘green’ consumers of a
renewable energy utility will respond to the cognitive dissonance intervention
12In a follow-up study where individuals made a pro-condom speech and recalled past
failures to practice safe sex, they demonstrated a preference for direct rather than self-
affirming dissonance reduction by choosing to purchase condoms rather than donate to a
homeless shelter Stone et al. (1997).
13It is worthwhile to note that subjects were volunteers for the study who could participate
only if they a) consented to have their energy use monitored throughout the study period,
and b) agree or strongly agree with the statement "It is your personal duty as a responsible
citizen to conserve as much electricity as possible." Therefore, selection and Hawthorne
effects may bias these results. Additionally, there is no mention of a balance check across
treatment arms.
14In a survey of UK households, past behavior was correlated with intentions to engage in
future green behaviors, though no actual behaviors were measured Whitmarsh and O’Neill
(2010).
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by switching from paper billing to online billing if the cost of such dissonance
sufficiently outweighs the benefits (i.e., convenience to the consumer of paper
billing and any perceived cost savings associated with its salience). Additionally,
in line with VBN theory and theories of identity, we posit that information on
environmental damage will trigger motivation to act altruistically, especially if
individuals have internalized the norms of eco-consciousness associated with
being a Good Energy customer. Finally, in line with the conclusion of Taylor
and Thompson (1982) that vividness may be important in the context of
everyday informational competition, we conjecture that environmental imagery
may serve to enhance the salience of environmental costs, thereby augmenting
the perceived benefits of taking action and increasing the probability of doing
so.
2 Experimental design
We partnered with Good Energy—the UK’s leading renewable energy supplier—
to randomize email content in a campaign to encourage customers to switch
from their current information channel (i.e., quarterly paper bills received by
mail) to online billing (i.e., quarterly bills received via email). The six-week
campaign ran in September and October of 2014.
As a business founded upon an environmental mission, Good Energy’s
objective was to achieve a switch rate as close to 100% as possible. Additionally,
online billing constitutes a cost reduction, as it requires fewer physical and
human resources than does paper billing. The experiment is primarily designed
to test the effectiveness of environmental savings information (‘environmental
framing’) and a reminder of the customers’ environmental preferences (‘cognitive
dissonance’). The design also allows for testing of the importance of relevant
imagery on customers’ decision making. The subject of each email announces
the arrival of the e-billing option, and emails are sent from Good Energy’s
Chief Operating Officer. The defining features of each email intervention are
detailed below.
2.1 Interventions
Control (Groups 1-2). In the control email, the first line unveils the online
billing option (‘availability line’ hereafter, emphasis included): “It’s finally
here! Now you can switch to e-billing and have your energy bills emailed
directly to your inbox rather than receiving them by post.” The subsequent
line touts online billing access (‘online access line’ hereafter): “Even better, you
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can access your bills online any time, so they won’t fill any valuable space in
your drawers or bins.” Both of the previous lines appear identically across all
interventions.
The key following control statement reads, “Here at Good Energy, we
prioritise customer satisfaction. The opportunity to switch to e-billing
is just one more step we have taken to keep you smiling.” Three benefits of
switching are subsequently listed: 1) Reduce paper waste; 2) Spend less time
sorting through mail; and 3) Access bills 24/7 online. The email includes a link
to make the switch, and all emails contain the same closing statement followed
by a signature from the Chief Operating Officer (for full email, see Figure A1
in Appendix).
Environmental Framing (Groups 3-4). This treatment provides in-
formation on the environmental benefits associated with a universal shift of
GE customers to e-billing. Following the availability line stated above, this
treatment states (emphasis included), “If all customers make the switch,
we would save 46 trees worth of paper each year!” This line is followed
by the online access line.
In addition to emphasizing GE’s attention to customer satisfaction, the next
line also points out its commitment to the environment (emphasis included):
“Here at Good Energy, we prioritise customer satisfaction as well as
the environment. The opportunity to switch to e-billing is just one more
step we have taken to keep you smiling and help you shrink your environmental
footprint.” The subsequent benefits no longer appeal to the customer herself,
but rather are informative of the extent of paper waste and its environmental
costs. The first bullet states, “The average UK family throws away 6 trees worth
of paper in their household bin each year.” The second pertains to the energy
and climate impacts of the paper industry as a whole: “Paper production
ranks 3rd and 4th for most energy intensive and greenhouse gas intensive
manufacturing industries (respectively).” Finally, we provide aggregate paper
use statistics for the UK: “12.5 million tonnes of paper and cardboard are used
annually in the UK, making us the 11th worst paper offender in the world.”
The email closes as indicated in the control description (for full email, see
Figure A2 in Appendix).
Control and Environmental Framing (Groups 5-6). While the con-
tent contained in the above treatment email is roughly the same length and
format as the control email, it contains some fundamentally different informa-
tion. Therefore, we also test whether provision of the environmental information
(presented to Groups 3 and 4) in addition to the control information (provided
to Groups 1 and 2) is effective, allowing us to control for the otherwise substan-
tial change in content from one email to the next (see Table 1). All information
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from both the control and the environmental framing email is aggregated into
one email (for full email, see Figure A3 in Appendix).
Cognitive Dissonance (Groups 7-8). Our final treatment quite closely
emulates the control email with the exception of a single line, so that length
and format are quite similar. Instead of emphasizing customer satisfaction, this
email appeals to one’s identity as a conscious decision maker: “As a Good
Energy customer, you are an environmental steward. By switching
to e-billing, you take another important step to eliminate the environmental
impact of your energy use.” The remainder of the email is identical to the
control email (for full email, see Figure A4 in Appendix).
Environmental Image (Groups 2, 4, 6, and 8). Finally, we test the
effectiveness of imagery—a central and customary component of Good Energy’s
communications strategy—in capturing customers’ attention. For each of the
above treatment emails, an additional treatment intervention existed with the
same email content with a vibrant image of trees at the outset (see Figure A5
in Appendix). All other content in the emails remains identical.
2.2 Sample
The main sample consists of 36,810 Good Energy customers, which is the
entire customer base omitting those for whom a working email address had
not been provided or for whom gender could not be identified. This sample is
47% female. The average customer had been with Good Energy for 315 days
and consumed 6450 kWh in gas and 3435 kilowatt-hours (kWh) in electricity
on an annual basis. Customers who were on a dual fuel account (i.e. who
have both gas and electricity accounts with Good Energy) comprise 41% of
the sample, while those with gas or electricity only constitute 6% and 53%,
respectively. A separate analysis is performed for those identified as either
‘Doctor’ or ‘Professor’ and are gender neutral in the data, of which there are
1844 customers (approximately 5% of the sample).15 Of these customers, the
average customer duration was 320 days, average annual gas and electricity
consumption were 7592 kWh and 3546 kWh (respectively), and 41%, 7%, and
52% were on dual-fuel, gas, and electricity contracts (respectively) in 2014.
The difference in the two samples is significant for annual gas consumption
(p<0.01) and proportion of gas-only customers (p<0.10). We control for all of
the above observables in the analysis.
15We are powered (β=0.8, α=0.05) to detect treatment effects of approximately 0.02
(approximately 15%) in the main sample, and 0.10 (approximately 25%) in the postgraduate
sample.
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More generally, the customers of Good Energy are fairly representative of
UK households more broadly in terms of energy consumption and costs. In our
data, the average estimated annual energy consumption is 3668 kWh, while the
average UK household in 2014 consumed 4001 kWh. On the other hand, Good
Energy gas customers use slightly more gas (13,827 kWh) than the average
British household (12,404 kWh) (Goodright and Wilkes, 2015). Additionally,
customers in our data likely pay similar prices per kWh. Due to increased
competitiveness of renewable energy in the UK energy market, Good Energy
customers pay a competitive price for their energy. On average, while dual fuel
customers of the UK’s ‘Big Six’ energy providers (i.e., those providers supplying
over 90% of domestic customers) paid approximately £1360 per household in
2013, Good Energy households paid £1313 (see Figure 1). Similarly, compared
to Ecotricity, one of Good Energy’s primary competitors in the UK renewable
energy market, Good Energy dual fuel customers paid £55 less per annum.
Therefore, cost of energy does not distinguish Good Energy households from
other UK households.
2.3 Randomization
All observable variables in the dataset were used in the stratified random-
ization.16 Specifically, customers were sorted according to the fuel type on
their account (gas only, electric only, or dual fuel), their estimated annual
consumption (partitioned into quartiles), the length of their contract with Good
Energy (partitioned into deciles), and the gender of the account holder (male,
female, unidentified). First, we sorted customers according to the three fuel
types, and within each fuel type we blocked them according to the estimated
annual total consumption quartiles, creating twelve blocks. Having sorted the
data into these twelve blocks, we then sorted customers in each block according
to duration of existing contract with Good Energy, followed by the account
holder’s gender. If all blocks had contained at least one customer, this would
have created 12× 10× 3 = 360 blocks in total. However, there are nine blocks
(i.e., combinations of the above variables used for stratification) for which
no customer in the dataset is representative, so the stratification created 351
blocks in total. Once the data is sorted according to the existing 351 blocks, a
number (1−8) is assigned to each account holder to allocate each customer to
16We perform the analysis with and without controlling for strata. Standard errors are
slightly inflated without strata, and we report these slightly more conservative estimates.
Qualitatively, the results remain entirely intact, which is unsurprising given the finding in
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) that all randomization methods will achieve balance as sample
sizes become large.
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one of the eight treatments described above.
Since Good Energy’s email server was limited in terms of the volume of
emails that could be sent in one day, the trial was planned for six weeks. We
tested for pre-experimental equivalence across all group pairs on the above
variables as well as the day of week on which the email would be sent, as shown
in the balance tables (see Tables 2a and 2b).17
3 Results
3.1 Treatment effects
In total, 13.42% of customers signed up for e-billing. In almost all cases,
the email without the image outperformed that with the image; while the
difference is not statistically significant when comparing all treatments without
images to all treatments with images (chi-square test; p=0.122), the difference
is significant when comparing the cognitive dissonance treatments with and
without images (chi-square test; p=0.054). Simple chi-square tests do not reveal
significant differences across treatments with varying information in the full
sample (see Table A1 in Appendix). We do, however, see significant differences
between outcomes in the Control and Cognitive Dissonance groups within the
main and postgraduate samples, which indicate opposing reactions from these
stratified groups. To reduce variation and increase power, we additionally
investigate treatment effects using logistical regression analysis controlling for
a number of observables in our data.
Our intent-to-treat analysis considers a binary response variable, and we
therefore report the results of a logit model (in terms of both odds ratios and
average marginal effects18). The logistic regression performed is specified as
follows:
logiti = α + βiTi,j + γXi + eit, eit ∼ N [0, 1]
17We additionally test for balance within the subsample of Doctors and Professors in Tables
2c and 2d. We find slight imbalance on energy consumption between the cognitive dissonance
groups (with and without images; p<0.10) and imbalance between the control and cognitive
dissonance groups in the number of days they have been customers of Good Energy (p<0.05).
We provide regression results with controls—including energy consumption—though the
number of days a customer has been with Good Energy has no predictive power in the model.
18Intuitively, the average marginal effects signify the average change in the dependent
variable if we consider a marginal increase in the respective independent variable for each
individual in the sample separately, then take the average of this marginal effect for all
subjects in the sample.
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Receiving the cognitive dissonance message (without image) multiplies the
odds that one signs up to e-billing by exp(0.105)=1.107, i.e., increases the
odds by 10.7% (or about an average 1.2% increase in uptake19) controlling
for consumption, tariff type, and gender (p<0.10). However, including the
image appears to distract from the dissonance-inducing messaging, eliminating
the effect altogether (consistent with the the t-tests above). While the odds
of sign-up also tend to increase for the treatment groups containing environ-
mental information, we do not have sufficient power to detect such an effect
with statistical significance. Contrary to findings in the literature regarding
environmental behavior and gender (see Cheng, Woon, and Lynes, 2011, for a
review), we find that being female decreases the odds of signing up to paperless
billing by 26.5%; as shown in Table A2, this result holds if we run the logit
without treatment indicators within the control group alone (26.5% reduction
in the odds of sign-up, p<0.01).20
Additionally, it appears that those with smaller observed environmental
footprints are more likely to sign up to e-billing. For instance, relative to those
on dual-fuel renewable tariffs, the odds of signing up among customers on
either gas- or electricity-only tariffs are approximately 40% and 43% lower
(p<0.01). Finally, for every increase of 1000 kWh in estimated annual gas and
electricity consumption, the odds of sign-up decrease by 0.004% (p<0.10) and
0.014% (p<0.01), respectively. If we assume that being a dual-fuel consumer is
indicative of higher environmental preferences than being a single-fuel consumer,
and that lower consumption is associated with higher environmental preferences,
these final two results appear to imply that individuals with stronger preferences
for the environment are more likely to sign up for paperless billing. 21
19In other words, if we consider the effect of the cognitive dissonance treatment for
each individual in the sample separately—holding constant all other characteristics of that
individual—and then take the mean of these marginal effects across all individuals in the
sample, we see that the average marginal effect is to increase the likelihood of signing up to
e-billing by 1.2%.
20There are no significant interaction effects between gender and treatment; these results
are available upon request.
21The data do not include household size, income, or age, so consumption may also act
as a proxy for wealth, number of residents, or age (and therefore also potentially computer
literacy) as opposed to environmental preference. We are unable to make this distinction
using the data provided.
16
3.2 Treatment effect heterogeneity
Since we do not have gender data for the 1844 individuals identified with the
title of either ‘Doctor’ or ‘Professor’, we run the logit for the two samples inde-
pendently. That is, in the absence of an all-inclusive continuous or categorical
measure for education, we run the same regression as in Table 3 exclusively
for the ‘postgraduate education’ sample (see Table 4). Contrary to the main
sample, the cognitive dissonance intervention quite drastically backfires when
we consider Doctors and Professors only, decreasing the odds of sign-up by
43.0%. Again, provision of statistics on associated environmental damage does
not significantly affect the odds of paperless take-up. Consumption does not
predict behavior among this subsample, while again being a dual-fuel customer
improves the probability that the individual will sign up quite substantially
(p<0.01).
If we instead run a logistic regression on the full sample that includes
interaction terms between assigned treatment and a dummy indicating whether
the individual is in the postgraduate education sample, we find a similar result
(Table A3). On average, having extensive postgraduate education increases
the odds of signing up to e-billing by 32% (p=0.141). Without controlling for
gender, the odds of signing up to e-billing in the cognitive dissonance (without
image) treatment increase by 10.7% (p=0.096) in the main sample, while the
odds decrease by 48.7% (p=0.023) for Doctors and Professors. Thus, we find
evidence that cognitive dissonance indeed backfires among the highly educated,
both in a regression with a stratified sample of interest and in a regression
using interaction terms among the full sample, suggesting a potential role for
heterogeneous treatment of individuals to maximize e-billing uptake.
4 Discussion
In line with the literature, the results of the experiment indicate that environ-
mental information and imagery do not affect individuals’ propensity to opt
into receiving paperless communications, even among purportedly green con-
sumers. However, appealing to customers’ desire for consistency of self-concept
holds promise, though it backfires among the postgraduate education sample.
Furthermore, our findings contradict the general conclusion in the literature
that females are more likely to engage in environmental behaviors than males.
The results indicate that informational campaigns are likely ineffective in pro-
moting environmental behaviors, and that individuals with revealed altruistic
preferences toward the environment may be susceptible to messaging invoking
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feelings of cognitive dissonance. Imagery does not encourage environmental
behavior in this context.
Given that the information provided is both easily available and free to
access, the non-effect of environmental information speaks to many existing
and emerging strands of literature on information and behavior. For example,
the results fall in line with the notion of information avoidance, where indi-
viduals actively choose to evade information that might make them engage
in altruistic behaviors that they otherwise do not wish to perform (Cain and
Dana, 2012; Golman et al., 2015). An alternative explanation stemming from
a phenomenon called moral licensing suggests that individuals who ‘do good’
along one dimension may allow themselves to ‘do bad’ (or simply not ‘do good’)
along another (see Merritt et al., 2010). Alternatively, perhaps the information
is sufficient to change beliefs and intentions (as claimed in Abrahamse et al.,
2005), though intentions have only been shown to be poorly correlated with
behavior change (Webb and Sheeran, 2006). Another possible explanation is
that GE customers are already well aware of such information so that additional
information has little effect on their beliefs—in line with a ‘diminishing returns’
argument (Stern, 2000)—or that the externalities are not sufficiently severe to
induce change.
Moreover, the experiment demonstrates that particular individuals may
be more or less susceptible to certain behavioral anomalies. In our case,
individuals titled ‘Doctor’ or ‘Professor’ are far less likely to opt into e-billing
if they receive the dissonance-inducing intervention as opposed to the control
intervention. One possible explanation is that individuals in the postgraduate
sample have higher cognitive skills, and that such cognitive skills determine
levels of experienced dissonance in the same way they have been experimentally
demonstrated to determine risk preferences and impatience ((Dohmen et al.,
2010)). Another possible reason for this contrasting effect may be due to such
individuals’ altruistic fulfillment in their field of work. Therefore, issues of
convenience—as highlighted in the control letter—may override concerns for
maintaining an altruistic self-concept. A third explanation rests in line with
Akerlof and Dickens’s theory in the sense that selection into a green utility
provider will solidify conviction of one’s own environmental consciousness and
will justify receipt of paper billing; when paperless billing is subsequently
offered in the second period, the individual has altered her attitude toward the
environmental harm of paper billing.
In sum, this research suggests that green businesses should consider aban-
doning the use of information regarding environmental externalities as a tool
to encourage environmentally beneficial decision making, and rather appeal
to their customer bases using more subtle tactics rooted in the psychology of
18
cognitive dissonance, with careful attention to the audience of the messaging.
Indeed, there are many additional tactics that could be equally—or possibly
more—effective in encouraging particular types of customers to continue to
make decisions in line with their past behaviors, and businesses can test vari-
ous interventions to identify subgroups to receive tailored interventions. This
particular tactic may well generalize to other groups of socially responsible
consumers, such as donors to particular causes or voters who have historically
engaged in altruistic or civic behaviors. Further research should aim to gain
a more nuanced understanding of the types of individuals who may or may
not be responsive to messaging that appeals to desires for consistency in the
self-concept to elucidate the underlying reason for this puzzling heterogeneity
in the observed responses in this study.
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5 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Average Standard Dual Fuel Bill (£/year, per home)
Notes : The data above were taken from Energy Helpline on 18 November 2013 and is based
on 3,300 kWh of electricity and 16,500 kWh of natural gas paid using direct debit on the
standard variable rate. The source of this chart is “Green Energy Suppliers in the UK
Compared to the Big 6”, accessed 30 March 2016 < http://shrinkthatfootprint.com/green-
electrical-supply-uk-big-6>.
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Figure 2: E-billing Uptake According to Group Assignment
Notes: The above bar graph shows the proportion of each study group that signed up to
e-billing, with standard error bars.
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Table 1: Treatment Group Design
Control +
Environmental Environmental Cognitive
Content Text Control Framing Framing Dissonance
Availability and It’s finally here! Now you
Online Access can switch to e-billing and
have your energy bills X X X X
emailed directly to your
inbox rather than receiving
them by post.
Customer The benefits of switching
Benefits from paper billing to
e-billing:
• Access bills 24/7 online; X X X
• Spend less time sorting
through mail;
• Reduce paper waste;
Environmental If all customers make the
Benefits switch, we would save 46
trees worth of paper each
year!
Why reduce paper
waste?
• The average UK family
throws away 6 trees
worth of paper in their
household bin each year.
• Paper production ranks X X
3rd and 4th for most
energy intensive and
greenhouse gas intensive
manufacturing industries
(respectively)
• 12.5 million tonnes of
paper and cardboard are
used annually in the UK
making us the 11th worst
paper offender in the
world
Environmental As a Good Energy
Steward customer, you are an
environmental steward.
By switching to e-billing,
you take another important X
step to eliminate the
environmental impact of
your energy use.
Notes: While the Control and Environmental Framing intervention simply adds environmental infor-
mation to the Control email, the email doubles in length with the addition. Therefore, we also include
the Environmental Framing intervention that is a similar length and format to the Control email so
that we can ‘control’ for the added complexity of including a large amount of additional information
to the Control email. All even-numbered groups receive the treatment with the image.
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Table 2a: Balance Check: Groups With vs. Without Images
Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality:
Group 1 Group 2 1=2 Group 3 Group 4 3=4 Group 5 Group 6 5=6 Group 7 Group 8 7=8
Fuel Type:
Dual Fuel 0.409 0.411 p=0.824 0.410 0.409 p=0.930 0.408 0.407 p=0.991 0.409 0.409 p=0.975
(0.492) (0.492) (0.492) (0.492) (0.491) (0.491) (0.492) (0.492)
Gas 0.062 0.062 p=0.949 0.063 0.061 p=0.628 0.062 0.062 p=0.967 0.062 0.062 p=0.943
(0.241) (0.241) (0.243) (0.239) (0.241) (0.241) (0.242) (0.241)
Electricity 0.529 0.527 p=0.803 0.527 0.53 p=0.748 0.530 0.531 p=0.975 0.529 0.530 p=0.948
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Gas 13.949 13.807 p=0.602 13.863 13.605 p=0.324 13.633 13.781 p=0.575 13.886 13.672 p=0.426
Consumption (9.352) (9.025) (9.038) (8.590) (8.757) (9.092) (9.284) (8.864)
Electricity 3.720 3.622 p=0.190 3.753 3.626 p=0.107 3.625 3.672 p=0.531 3.685 3.640 p=0.548
Consumption (3.845) (3.231) (4.162) (3.283) (3.419) (3.671) (3.419) (3.615)
Days as 314.8 313.9 p=0.887 312.1 313.3 p=0.861 317.4 317.2 p=0.977 316.7 318.8 p=0.770
Customer (333.9) (321.0) (327.5) (333.8) (338.3) (344.0) (342.4) (346.7)
Gender 0.469 0.468 p=0.952 0.470 0.471 p=0.907 0.470 0.470 p=0.991 0.469 0.472 p=0.677
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Postgraduate 0.045 0.046 p=0.860 0.050 0.051 p=0.830 0.048 0.051 p=0.446 0.046 0.045 p=0.677
Education (0.208) (0.210) (0.217) (0.219) (0.213) (0.220) (0.210) (0.207)
Sample Size 4817 4825 4834 4850 4830 4838 4825 4836
Notes: The table checks for balance across observables for groups with identical intervention content, where one group receives the envi-
ronmental image and the other does not. The p-values in the table derive from chi-square tests (for comparisons of dummy and categorical
variables) and t-tests (for comparisons of continuous variables). Group 1 is the Control group, 2 is Control with image, 3 is the Control and
Environmental Framing, 4 is Control and Environmental Framing with image, 5 is Environmental Framing, 6 is Environmental Framing with
image, 7 is Cognitive Dissonance, and 8 is Cognitive Dissonance with image. The table pertains to individuals in the entire sample, except
for the following: gender balance tests are conducted only for individuals for whom gender is identified, and balance tests on annual gas and
electricity consumption are conducted only for individuals who consume gas and energy, respectively. Annual estimated energy and gas con-
sumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. The fuel type dummy variables specify the type of fuel the customer receives from Good
Energy, where “dual fuel” indicates that they receive both gas and electricity. Gas and electricity consumption are estimated annual usage
values measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. Female is equal to one if the customer is female, and postgraduate education is equal to 1 if the
customer holds a title of ‘Doctor’ or ‘Professor’. Standard deviations are reported below means in parentheses.
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Table 2b: Balance Check: Control vs. Treatments
Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality:
1=3 1=4 1=5 1=6 1=7 1=8
Fuel Type:
Dual Fuel p=0.923 p=0.993 p=0.886 p=0.877 p=0.998 p=0.971
Gas p=0.762 p=0.856 p=0.934 p=0.968 p=0.947 p=0.972
Electricity p=0.809 p=0.937 p=0.919 p=0.894 p=0.972 p=0.985
Gas Cons. p=0.751 p=0.197 p=0.240 p=0.540 p=0.819 p=0.305
Electricity Cons. p=0.700 p=0.208 p=0.214 p=0.540 p=0.645 p=0.310
Days as Customer p=0.681 p=0.815 p=0.709 p=0.733 p=0.787 p=0.573
Gender p=0.937 p=0.845 p=0.897 p=0.906 p=0.949 p=0.792
Postgrad. Educ. p=0.330 p=0.234 p=0.622 p=0.210 p=0.820 p=0.850
Day of Week p=0.998 p=0.971 p=0.925 p=0.992 p=0.912 p=0.759
Notes: The table checks for balance on observables between the control group and all treatment groups (see Table 2a for means and sample sizes). The p-values
in the table derive from chi-square tests (for comparisons of dummy and categorical variables) and t-tests (for comparisons of continuous variables). Group 1 is
the Control group, 2 is Control with image, 3 is the Control and Environmental Framing, 4 is Control and Environmental Framing with image, 5 is Environmen-
tal Framing, 6 is Environmental Framing with image, 7 is Cognitive Dissonance, and 8 is Cognitive Dissonance with image. The table pertains to individuals in
the entire sample, except for the following: gender balance tests are conducted only for individuals for whom gender is identified, and balance tests on annual
gas and electricity consumption are conducted only for individuals who consume Good Energy gas and energy, respectively. Annual estimated energy and gas
consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. The fuel type dummy variables specify the type of fuel the customer receives from Good Energy, where
“dual fuel” indicates that they receive both gas and electricity. Gas and electricity consumption are estimated annual usage values measured at the unit of 1000
kWh. Female is equal to one if the customer is female, and postgraduate education is equal to 1 if the customer holds a title of ‘Doctor’ or ‘Professor’. Day of
week is a categorical variable indicating the day of week on which the customer received the treatment email; since means do not provide valuable information
for this variable, we simply report the p-value for the chi-square test.
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Table 2c: Balance Check (Postgraduate Sample): Groups With vs. Without Images
Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality:
Group 1 Group 2 1=2 Group 3 Group 4 3=4 Group 5 Group 6 5=6 Group 7 Group 8 7=8
Fuel Type:
Dual Fuel 0.388 0.422 p=0.475 0.413 0.400 p=0.710 0.391 0.385 p=0.881 0.433 0.449 p=0.735
(0.488) (0.495) (0.493) (0.490) (0.489) (0.487) (0.497) (0.499)
Gas 0.064 0.067 p=0.887 0.083 0.090 p=0.800 0.074 0.077 p=0.901 0.058 0.056 p=0.911
(0.245) (0.251) (0.277) (0.286) (0.262) (0.267) (0.234) (0.230)
Electricity 0.548 0.511 p=0.439 0.504 0.514 p=0.824 0.535 0.538 p=0.936 0.509 0.495 p=0.776
(0.499) (0.500) (0.501) (0.501) (0.500) (0.500) (0.501) (0.501)
Gas 16.736 15.542 p=0.409 15.829 16.178 p=0.806 15.463 15.479 p=0.991 16.257 14.977 p=0.317
Consumption (9.921) (10.777) (10.942) (10.988) (9.509) (9.998) (9.861) (9.006)
Electricity 3.898 3.766 p=0.672 3.827 3.627 p=0.498 3.673 3.840 p=0.567 4.422 3.499 p=0.068
Consumption (3.134) (3.208) (3.434) (2.748) (2.965) (3.138) (5.937) (4.169)
Days as 341.2 354.4 p=0.737 303.3 308.0 p=0.848 311.9 352.2 p=0.265 282.3 302.6 p=0.130
Customer (427.5) (396.7) (241.3) (289.6) (321.2) (451.5) (81.1) (182.1)
Sample Size 219 223 240 245 230 247 224 216
Notes: The table checks for balance of observables within the postgraduate education sample across groups with identical intervention con-
tent, where one group receives the environmental image and the other does not. The p-values in the table derive from chi-square tests (for
comparisons of dummy and categorical variables) and t-tests (for comparisons of continuous variables). Group 1 is the Control group, 2 is
Control with image, 3 is the Control and Environmental Framing, 4 is Control and Environmental Framing with image, 5 is Environmental
Framing, 6 is Environmental Framing with image, 7 is Cognitive Dissonance, and 8 is Cognitive Dissonance with image. Balance tests on an-
nual gas and electricity consumption are conducted only for individuals who consume gas and energy, respectively. Annual estimated energy
and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. The fuel type dummy variables specify the type of fuel the customer receives
from Good Energy, where “dual fuel” indicates that they receive both gas and electricity. Gas and electricity consumption are estimated
annual usage values measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. Standard deviations are reported below means in parentheses.
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Table 2d: Balance Check (Postgraduate Sample): Control vs. Treatments
Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality: Test of Equality:
1=3 1=4 1=5 1=6 1=7 1=8
Fuel Type:
Dual Fuel p=0.595 p=0.864 p=0.945 p=0.938 p=0.337 p=0.198
Gas p=0.428 p=0.298 p=0.677 p=0.585 p=0.796 p=0.713
Electricity p=0.348 p=0.468 p=0.780 p=0.837 p=0.411 p=0.272
Gas Cons. p=0.526 p=0.697 p=0.348 p=0.359 p=0.728 p=0.182
Electricity Cons. p=0.825 p=0.342 p=0.452 p=0.849 p=0.262 p=0.275
Days as Customer p=0.238 p=0.411 p=0.788 p=0.323 p=0.044 p=0.222
Notes: The table checks for balance on observables within the postgraduate education sample between the control group and all treatment groups (see Table
2c for means and sample sizes). The p-values in the table derive from chi-square tests (for comparisons of dummy and categorical variables) and t-tests (for
comparisons of continuous variables). Group 1 is the Control group, 2 is Control with image, 3 is the Control and Environmental Framing, 4 is Control and En-
vironmental Framing with image, 5 is Environmental Framing, 6 is Environmental Framing with image, 7 is Cognitive Dissonance, and 8 is Cognitive Dissonance
with image. Balance tests on annual gas and electricity consumption are conducted only for individuals who consume Good Energy gas and energy, respectively.
Annual estimated energy and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. The fuel type dummy variables specify the type of fuel the customer
receives from Good Energy, where “dual fuel” indicates that they receive both gas and electricity. Gas and electricity consumption are estimated annual usage
values measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. Female is equal to one if the customer is female, and postgraduate education is equal to 1 if the customer holds a title
of ‘Doctor’ or ‘Professor’. Day of week is a categorical variable indicating the day of week on which the customer received the treatment email; since means do
not provide valuable information for this variable, we simply report the p-value for the chi-square test.
32
Table 3: Logit Regression — Main Sample
OR Marginal OR Marginal
G2: Control, Image 0.971 -0.003 0.968 -0.004
(0.060) (0.007) (0.060) (0.007)
G3: Env 1.017 0.002 1.018 0.002
(0.062) (0.007) (0.063) (0.007)
G4: Env, Image 0.997 -0.000 0.996 -0.000
(0.061) (0.007) (0.062) (0.007)
G5: Control Env 1.042 0.005 1.042 0.005
(0.064) (0.007) (0.064) (0.007)
G6: Control Env, Image 1.046 0.005 1.047 0.005
(0.064) (0.007) (0.064) (0.007)
G7: Cog Diss 1.105* 0.012* 1.107* 0.012*
(0.067) (0.007) (0.067) (0.007)
G8: Cog Diss, Image 0.964 -0.004 0.965 -0.004
(0.06) (0.007) (0.06) (0.007)
Gas
Consumption 0.996* -0.001*
(0.002) (0.000)
Energy
Consumption 0.986*** -0.002***
(0.005) (0.001)
Tariff:
Gas Only 0.597*** -0.050***
(0.043) (0.006)
Tariff:
Electric Only 0.569*** -0.065***
(0.026) (0.005)
Female 0.735*** -0.035***
(0.023) (0.004)
Constant 0.152*** 0.257***
(0.007) (0.015)
Observations 36,810 36,810 36,810 36,810
Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: The above logit regression pertains to individuals in the main sample. Annual
estimated energy and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh.
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Table 4: Logit Regression — Postgraduate Education Sample
OR Marginal OR Marginal
G2: Control, Image 0.946 -0.007 0.929 -0.009
(0.245) (0.032) (0.242) (0.032)
G3: Env 1.110 0.014 1.10 0.012
(0.275) (0.034) (0.274) (0.033)
G4: Env, Image 0.992 -0.001 0.986 -0.002
(0.249) (0.032) (0.249) (0.032)
G5: Control Env 0.943 -0.007 0.936 -0.008
(0.243) (0.032) (0.242) (0.032)
G6: Control Env, Image 0.867 -0.018 0.869 -0.017
(0.222) (0.031) (0.224) (0.031)
G7: Cog Diss 0.582* -0.060** 0.570* -0.062**
(0.166) (0.027) (0.164) (0.027)
G8: Cog Diss, Image 0.917 -0.011 0.876 -0.016
(0.241) (0.032) (0.232) (0.032)
Gas
Consumption 1.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.001)
Energy
Consumption 0.969 -0.004
(0.024) (0.003)
Tariff:
Gas Only 0.446*** -0.081***
(0.137) (0.024)
Tariff:
Electric Only 0.655** -0.054**
(0.132) (0.026)
Constant 0.197*** 0.285***
(0.036) (0.070)
Observations 1844 1844 1844 1844
Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: The above logit regression pertains to individuals in the main sample. Annual
estimated energy and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh.
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A Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
35
Table A1: Proportion Signed up to E-Billing: Chi-Square Tests Comparing Experimental Conditions
Control and
Environmental Environmental Cognitive
Control Framing Test of Equality: Framing Test of Equality: Test of Equality Dissonance Test of Equality
(C) (EF) C vs. EF (CEF) C vs. CEF EF vs. CEF (CD) C vs. CD
Full Sample:
No Image 0.134 0.136 0.138 0.142
(0.340) (0.343) p=0.693 (0.345) p=0.539 p=0.826 (0.349) p=0.226
N=4817 N=4830 N=4834 N=4824
Image 0.130 0.134 0.138 0.129
(0.337) (0.340) p=0.624 (0.345) p=0.261 p=0.526 (0.335) p=0.893
N=4825 N=4838 N=4850 N=4836
Pooled 0.132 0.135 0.138 0.136
(0.338) (0.342) p=0.532 (0.345) p=0.219 p=0.546 (0.343) p=0.439
N=9642 N=9668 N=9684 N=9660
Main Sample:
No Image 0.132 0.134 0.137 0.144
(0.339) (0.341) p=0.781 (0.344) p=0.498 p=0.690 (0.351) p=0.098
N=4598 N=4590 N=4604 N=4600
Image 0.129 0.132 0.138 0.128
(0.335) (0.338) p=0.661 (0.344) p=0.221 p=0.433 (0.334) p=0.918
N=4602 N=4593 N=4603 N=4620
Pooled 0.131 0.133 0.137 0.136
(0.337) (0.340) p=0.612 (0.344) p=0.179 p=0.403 (0.343) p=0.398
N=9200 N=9183 N=9207 N=9220
Postgraduate Sample:
No Image 0.164 0.179 0.157 0.103
(0.371) (0.384) p=0.675 (0.364) p=0.820 p=0.512 (0.304) p=0.056
N=219 N=240 N=230 N=224
Image 0.157 0.163 0.146 0.153
(0.365) (0.370) p=0.852 (0.354) p=0.735 p=0.591 (0.361) p=0.904
N=223 N=245 N=247 N=216
Pooled 0.161 0.171 0.151 0.127
(0.368) (0.377) p=0.668 (0.358) p=0.686 p=0.394 (0.334) p=0.778
N=442 N=485 N=477 N=440
Notes: The table shows the results of tests of equality of proportion of individuals who sign up across experimental conditions for all subjects in
the study sample, where groups with and without images (e.g., G1 and G2) are pooled in the final row. Standard deviations are presented below
means in parentheses.
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Table A2: Effects of Observed Covariates
(Control Group Only)
OR Marginal
Electricity Consumption 0.993 -0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
Gas Consumption 0.985 -0.002
(0.014) (0.002)
Tariff: Gas Only 0.581*** -0.052***
(0.118) (0.016)
Tariff: Electricity Only 0.530*** -0.073***
(0.069) (0.015)
Female 0.735*** -0.036***
(0.065) (0.010)
Constant 0.272***
(0.032)
Observations 4598 4598
Notes: The above logit regression pertains to the individuals
in the control group (without image) of the main sample. An-
nual estimated energy and gas consumption are measured at
the unit of 1000 kWh.
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Table A3: Postgraduate
Education and Treatment
OR Marginal
G2: Control, Image 0.969 -0.004
(0.060) (0.007)
G3: Env 1.018 0.003
(0.063) (0.007)
G4: Env, Image 0.996 -0.001
(0.062) (0.007)
G5: Control Env 1.042 0.004
(0.064) (0.007)
G6: Control Env, Image 1.047 0.004
(0.064) (0.007)
G7: Cog Diss 1.107* 0.008
(0.067) (0.007)
G8: Cog Diss, Image 0.965 -0.005
(0.060) (0.007)
G2*Educ 0.956
(0.256)
G3*Educ 0.898
(0.238)
G4*Educ 0.826
(0.219)
G5*Educ 1.074
(0.276)
G6*Educ 0.987
(0.256)
G7*Educ 0.513**
(0.150)
G8*Educ 0.912
(0.247)
Gas Consumption 0.996 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Energy Consumption 0.987*** -0.002***
(0.005) (0.001)
Tariff: Gas Only 0.605*** -0.050***
(0.042) (0.006)
Tariff: Electric Only 0.581*** -0.063***
(0.026) (0.005)
Educ 1.319 0.019**
(0.248) (0.009)
Constant 0.220***
(0.012)
Observations 38,654 38,654
Notes: The above logit regression includes all indi-
viduals in the study sample. Annual estimated en-
ergy and gas consumption are measured at the unit
of 1000 kWh.
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Figure A1: Control Intervention
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Figure A2: Environmental Framing Intervention
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Figure A3: Control and Environmental Framing Intervention
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Figure A4: Cognitive Dissonance Intervention
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Figure A5: Email Image
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